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1. Project Data
Name. WASTE DISPOSAL PROJECT L/C/TF Number: 3 8300
Country/Department: REPUBLIC OF KOREA Region: East Asia and Pacific
Region
Sector/subsector: WS - Sewerage
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PCD. 12/03/1 993 Effective: 10/27/1995
Appraisal: 09/2 1 /1994 MTR.
Approval: 12/20/ 1994 Closing: 06/30/2000 12/31/2001
Borrower/lmplementing Agency. Republic of Korea/MIN. OF CONSTRUCTION
Other Partners.
STAFF Current At Appraisal
Vice President: Mr. Jemal-ud-din Kassum Mr. Russell Cheetham
Coun try Manager: Mr. Vinay Bhargava Mr. Callisto Madavo
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Team Leader at ICR: Mr. Ming Zhang Mr. Jaroslav Kozel
ICR Primary Author: Mr. Jaroslav Kozel
2. Principal Performance Ratings
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactoty, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly
Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substanbial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)
Outcome: S
Sustainabilitv: L
Institutional Development Impact: SU
Bunk Performance: S
Borrower Performance: S
QAG (if available) ICR
Quality at Entry: S
Project at Risk at Any Time: No
3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry
3. I Original Objective.
Background. In the early 1990s, Korea's industrialization, improved living standards and rapid urban
population growth had resulted in the generation of large quantities of various kinds of waste. Wastewater
was projected to grow from 11 million m3/d in 1990 to 19 million M3/d in 2001; solid waste from 145,000
t/d to 250,000 t/d; and specified waste (defined as toxic work-site waste such as acids and alkalis, oils,
organic solvents, asbestos, pesticides, polychlorinated bi-phenl, and sludge containing heavy metals) from
3,000 t/d to 12,500 t/d. Korea's waste treatment facilities could not keep up with the rising levels of waste.
The Government recognized these environmental deficiencies and had created institutions and regulations to
control waste disposal, and had defined national level plans to prevent contamination and preserve the
environment. It then requested Bank financing and expertise to implement a project for wastewater
treatment and disposal of specified waste.
The key objective of the project was to support the Government of Korea in addressing environmental,
institutional and technological concerns regarding wastewater and specified waste disposal. Specifically,
the project would reduce the health hazards caused by air, soil and water contamination by specified
[hazardous] waste in Chunbuk province by its incineration in Kunsan plant; and treat industrial wastewater
and to promote the reuse of treatment plant effluent on a major scale in Pusan City.
Assessment. The objectives were clear, important for the country and consistent with the overall Country
Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the graduation plan for Korea. The CAS had identified the need to improve
the environment, which involved managing wastewater and solid waste, as an area in which the country
would benefit from Bank participation. Accordingly, the project included two diverse components each
focused on a special environmental issue. Its design provided for the construction of facilities which would
maintain or improve air, soil and water quality, and for delivery of technological and operational expertise
in specified waste management. It also linked expansion and upgrading of a major wastewater treatment
plant with water conservation. The project components were neither unusually complex or risky, nor
unduly demanding given the implementing capacities of executing agencies, the Environmental
Management Corporation (EMC) acting on behalf of the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and the Pusan
Sewerage Division (PSD) for the Pusan Metropolitan Government.
3.2 Revised Olgec tive:
n.a.
3.3 Original Componen ts
Kunsan component. This component comprised the construction of a specified waste incineration plant
with a capacity of 60 t/d, and training for the incinerator management and operations staff. The incinerator
plant was conceived as a state-of-the-art advanced specified waste technology serving as a model facility in
the country. It would consist of a high-temperature rotary kiln supported by associated equipment and
various environmental controls, in particular for the emission of stack gases. The incinerator plant was to
be an integral part of a comprehensive treatment facility for specified waste, which includes a secured
landfill and leachate treatment.
For various reasons, such as uncertainty in forecasting the generation of specified waste (related to the
country economic performance), and public resistance to disposal sites or operation of facilities, the private
sector has had little presence in intermediate treatment (incinerators) and almost none in final treatment
(controlled landfill) of specified waste. In order to control the disposal of specified waste in the country,
MOE decided to retain responsibility for disposal of specified waste and to construct one specific waste
treatment facility in each of its six regions. Implementation of this program started with the Kunsan plant in
Chunbuk province. The facility, the Kunsan Specified Waste Treatment Plant, is located about 20km west
of Kunsan City. It was built and initially operated by EMC, mainly to serve the adjacent Kunsan Industrial
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Estate (KIE) and several smaller producers of specified waste in Chunbuk province. KIE when fully
developed in an area of 43 km2 would employ over 30,000 in heavy- and metallurgical manufacturing.
The Pusan component included construction of the second phase of the Janglim wastewater treatment plant
(Janglim II) with a capacity of 265,000 m3/d, construction of tertiary treatment for Janglim I and II with a
total capacity of 615,OOOm3/d, and construction of interceptor sewers (4.5krn) with two associated
pumping stations (45,800m3/d and 89,800rn3/d). Janglim I and II use conventional activated sludge
treatment technology. The proposed tertiary treatment consisted of conventional flocculation (using alum
in combination with polymers), followed by rapid upward flow filtration, and disinfection if needed.
Located on the bank of the mouth of the Nakdong River and discharging the effluent into Nakdong Bay, the
Janglim WTP serves Pusan's principal catchment of 50 km2 with a population of over one million plus
various textile, chemical, leather as well as heavy industries, including metallurgy and shipbuilding.
Between 1993-94, the first phase WTP constructed in 1991 almost reached capacity at maximum flows,
and on the basis of sewerage master plan projections, the City decided to construct the second phase WTP
with completion in 2000.
During project preparation, MOE ruled that in view of sensitive ecology, seaweed farming and the newly
established migratory bird sanctuary in the Nakdong Bay, the Janglim effluent from both the first and
second phases should be discharged outside the Nakdong Bay through the sea outfall over 15 km long.
Otherwise, the effluent must comply with stricter environmental standards than those applicable to other
treatment plants in Korea. Upon examination of the alternatives, Pusan City decided to discharge Janglim
effluent into the Nakdong Bay. In order to comply with MOE requirements, it would construct tertiary
treatment facilities for the combined capacity of Janglim I and II. Future re-use of such highly treated
effluent for industrial purposes in the catchment was also taken into account.
3.4 Revised Components:
Revisions were made to each component, but these did not constitute a major restructuring and were thus
not submitted for Board approval.
Kunsan component: The turnkey contract was amended in December 1997 to include facilities for dioxin
removal from effluent gases to comply with MOE's new, stricter regulations. Following the Bank's
no-objection, the costs and construction period were amended accordingly.
Pusan component: The component was substantially revised due to a necessary change in the technological
process. The rationale for the change was as follows. Janglim I had been treating a mixture of about 80%
residential and 20% industrial wastewater. The treatment performance was satisfactory in all parameters
until about 1995-96 when the content of nitrogen in wastewater increased when additional manufacturing
plants were connected to the WTP through gradual expansion of interceptor sewers in the catchment. The
treatment performance remained satisfactory with the exception of nitrogen removal. Subsequently, the
technology for tertiary treatment, which was supposed to improve and guarantee the effluent quality in
accordance with environmental requirements, was found inappropriate in view of the varying quality of
incoming effluent within the span of a few years; further studies and designs were stopped.
Between 1997 and 1999, Pusan focused on the key problem of high nitrogen content, which was not
removable to the required degree by conventional activated sludge technology. Following extensive pilot
experiments, Pusan adopted a technology (modified five-stage Bardenpho method) developed by two Pusan
universities. The advantage of that technology was that it required only changes in equipment but not in
civil works. The new process is built into the sedimentation and aeration tanks constructed for the initial
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conventional secondary treatment. Procurement variations related only to the equipment, additional dosing
of nutrients and the chemical house, The pilot experiments proved the removal of nitrogen and phosphorus
to acceptable levels and, considering the changed wastewater quality, the Bank had no-objection to the
proposed modifications to the component. The modified technology was implemented in Janglim II, and its
extension to Janglim I will be decided upon following tests of the performance of Janglim II and its impact
on the receiving Nakdong Bay throughout the year.
Assessment of the Design and Components
Kunsan component: The selection and design of both components correctly addressed the key
environmental, waste management and conservation objectives of the Government. The particular Kunsan
locality chosen was appropriate because it was in the vicinity of a quickly developing major industrial
estate likely to generate great quantities of environmentally very dangerous waste. The Kunsan Specified
Waste Treatment Plant was to provide for final disposal of specified waste since it included both an
incineration facility and a secured landfill. The component, however, included only the incineration plant
through which an advanced specified waste treatment technology not then available in the country could be
demonstrated.
Pusan component: For wastewater treatment, Janglim in Metropolitan Pusan was chosen. In Pusan the
Bank had earlier supported construction of the Nambu wastewater treatment plant, one of four major
treatment plants. Therefore the Bank was in a strong position to understand the technical and institutional
sector issues in the city. The Janglim plant serves Pusan's old industrial area which has difficult-to-treat
wastewater, and the plant discharges treated effluent in an environmentally sensitive area. Instead of the
proposed initial alternative of conventional treatment with effluent discharge into the ocean through a piped
outfall several kilometers long, the Bank supported tertiary treatment, which would comply with
environmental requirements for discharge quality. This alternative also made it possible to reuse water in
industrial plants in the area. This, in turn, reduced the amount of residual pollution discharged and at the
same time demonstrated water conservation on a major scale.
In both cities, the implementing agencies had strong institutional capacity to carry out their respective
component
3. 5 Qzuality at Entry:
The project quality at entry was satisfactory. The project objectives were consistent with the Government
priorities and with the CAS. Appraisal was based on an advanced status of preparation. The designs and
draft bidding documents for Kunsan were completed, and the designs for the Pusan wastewater treatment
plant were advanced. The assessment of implementing agencies and their financial analyses was
appropriate. The implementing agencies, the Environmental Management Corporation (EMC) for Kunsan
and the Pusan Sewerage Division (PSD) for Pusan, carried out preparation studies and designs. A
supporting firm of consultants was selected and financed by EMC and PSD from their own resources, thus
signaling strong government commitment to the project. Bank reviews of studies resulted in selecting a
lower capacity design for the incinerator over the alternatives considered in Kunsan, and in a decision
favoring water conservation instead of discharging wastewater through a long sea outfall in Pusan.
The Bank's safeguard policies were taken into account satisfactorily. Both Kunsan and Pusan plants are
on reclaimed land not previously occupied. The Kunsan plant was constructed on 10 ha of land reclaimed
in 1988 by the Korea Land Development Corporation along the left bank of the Kum River and purchased
by MOE in 199 1. It had never been used and its acquisition did not involve involuntary resettlement or
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related compensation issues. The Pusan plant was constructed on 8 ha of land reclaimed in 1988 by the
Korea Water Resources Corporation along the left bank of the Nakdong River and purchased by Pusan
City in early 1995. Its only use was by a sawmill, which rented the plot for storage of wood logs. Its
acquisition, therefore, did not involve involuntary resettlement or related compensation issues. The
implementing agencies, EMC and Pusan, prepared their respective environmental impact assessments
(EIA). These were approved by MOE, reviewed by the Bank, and summaries were made available to the
Board in September 1994. Project preparation took about 12 months; negotiations were carried out in
field following appraisal.
4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs
4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:
Kunsan component: Under the 1993 National Comprehensive Waste Disposal Plan (hereafter refered to as
the Plan), the roles of the government and private sector were placed in the context of a policy aimed at
environmental protection by reducing the volume of waste, recycling and appropriate treatment. In the Plan
the private sector was to play an important role in reducing the volume of waste and recycling, but was not
expected to be involved in the treatment of specified waste. The Plan's strategy led the Government to take
the initiative to establish integrated waste treatment plants in major industrial estates.
The Kunsan plant was the first integrated specific waste treatment plant designed to use the state-of-the-art
technology to set standards for specified waste treatment plants and to serve as a training facility. The plant
is a model facility, which demonstrates in practice the feasibility of higher quality treatment on one hand,
supported by a series of respective regulations controlling the handling of specified waste on the other.
During construction of the Kunsan plant, the Government made complementary reforms in sector policy
and legislation. The February 1999 amendment to the Waste Disposal Act adopted: (a) a stronger
specified waste tracking system; (b) increased penalties for illegal disposal; (c) penalties for both the waste
generator and disposal agent for inadequate treatment; and (d) owner's liability for polluted land.
These stricter monitoring regulations succeeded in significantly reducing industrial waste generation,
stimulating more demand for treatment of specified waste, and generating private sector interest in
operating treatment facilities. This success is demonstrated by the fact that in the late 1990s, the number of
secured landfills and incinerators for specified waste increased to 17 and 129 respectively, the majority
being operated by private operators, as shown in following table.
Treatment Plants for Specified Waste
Facilities Landfill Incinerator
Number Capacity (million m3) Number Capacity (tons/day)
Public 4 0.2 l 60
Private 13 1.0 128 2,273
Total 17 1.2 129 2,333
The Kunsan component fully achieved the project's and the Government's objectives in a satisfactory
manner. The plant was the first integrated specific waste treatment plant using state-of-the-art technology
to set standards. It is a model facility, which demonstrates in practice the feasibility of higher quality
treatment. Although the desired highest performance of the Kunsan plant in all parameters is costlier than
less sophisticated facilities, it has provided MOE with an important understanding of the relationship
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between costs and environmental standards.
Pusan component: In 1994, the wastewater quantity flowing into the Janglim I WTP was already nearing
its design capacity of 330,000m3/d. As the interceptor sewer program progressed and connected up more
sections of the catchment area, flows were expected to increase to about 500,000m3/d by 2001. Extension
of the plant was essential to avoid unacceptable overloading, which would have resulted in a deterioration
of its treatment performance. That apparently standard technical and institutional task proved difficult
from the start through implementation.
The first difficulty occurred during preparation. Following review of the EIA, MOE stated that the effluent
quality being achieved by the activated sludge treatment technology used in Janglim I and II was not
acceptable for discharge into an ecologically sensitive area such as the Nakdong Bay, so MOE requested
that the effluent be diverted outside the Bay by a long sea outfall. In the pursuing discussions, Pusan
agreed to implement adequate treatment to comply with environmental regulations and proposed tertiary
treatment to raise the effluent to the quality required for discharge into the Bay. The Bank supported that
decision since the proposed additional treatment would allow for future water reuse and water conservation;
the Bank subsequently appraised that component.
During the early stages of Janglim II construction, a second more serious problem arose. In 1995-96 it
became clear that the industries newly connected to the WTP through the expanded interceptor system
substantially changed the raw wastewater quality, which could not be treated by the proposed combination
of secondary and tertiary treatment. With this finding Pusan stopped all works on tertiary treatment and
started studies on a suitable treatrnent technology for the new wastewater quality. Several studies by
consulting firms and research institutes failed to find a solution. Only in early 1999 did two Pusan
universities propose and demonstrate in a pilot experiment a treatment process with satisfactory results.
On the basis of this study, Pusan decided to replace the initially designed activated sludge process now
unsuitable for the new wastewater quality arriving in Janglim WTP. The Bank expressed its no-objection
to that decision.
The third issue arose with implementation of the agreed tertiary treatment. The modified process only
replaced the secondary treatment. The treatment performance of the process would comply with the
country's strict regulations for good quality rivers; however, to be accepted into the especially sensitive
Nakdong Bay, the effluent still required additional improvement through some type of follow-up polishing.
Considering the circumstances, Pusan decided to implement the modified process in Janglim II, then
evaluate the treatment performance and impact on the Nakdong Bay. Subject to satisfactory results, it
intended to carry on with similar modifications to Janglim I. In parallel or following completion of Janglim
I, it would implement the facilities necessary to polish the effluent to comply with MOE requirements. The
Bank reviewed the status and agreed to close the project following the completion of Janglim II
construction.
A further issue which ran in parallel with implementation of Janglim II involved the sludge from the WTP.
At appraisal it was agreed that upon completion of the project, the sea disposal of digested and de-watered
sludge generated in Janglim I would be discontinued and that the sludge generated in both Janglim I and II
would be disposed of in a sanitary landfill. PSD negotiations with sanitary landfill management to accept
treatment plant sludge were negative, and PSD proposed to the City to construct an incinerator for
intermediate disposal of sludge at Janglim. The Bank was willing to consider financing the construction of
the incinerator within the component. Finally, due to financial constraints, the City decided to continue sea
disposal for several years more, and the amount of loan reserved for that was cancelled.
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Tests carried out on the completed Janglim II have shown that the effluent from the plant has consistently
achieved or surpassed design parameters except for nitrogen, which it failed to reduce to the required level.
The reasons are not clear but a preliminary assessment indicates high nitrogen content in the raw
wastewater and possibly non-compliance with the process technology. PSD is now carrying out a detailed
examination of nitrogen sources and a review of technology with the aim of achieving design parameters for
removal of nitrogen.
This component achieved its objectives only partially. Through physical implementation of the treatment
plant it supported the Government in addressing environmental, institutional and technological concerns
regarding treatment of industrial wastewater. However, unexpected changes in wastewater quality during
construction, in combination with new, extremely strict environmental regulations for the treated effluent
scuttled the initial project concept. The originally designed combination of conventional secondary
treatment with tertiary stage was rendered an unsuitable treatment technology and had to be abandoned
together with its potential reuse of treated effluent. Technological modifications of the treatment process,
which should respond to the raw water quality change, were identified and implemented, though after a long
period of indecision by Pusan authorities. Currently, the residential and industrial wastewater generated in
the Janglim catchment is treated before its discharge into the Nakdong Bay, which represents a
considerable environmental improvement. However, additional polishing of effluent is required to comply
with current MOE regulations, particularly with regard to nitrogen content.
4.2 Outputs by components:
Kunsan component: The Kunsan component was implemented under a turnkey contract which included the
incinerator and associated equipment with a capacity of 60 t/d of specified waste. It included the plant
design, construction, commissioning and management support during the early operational stages. The
contract was awarded in December 1995 and the facility was ready for testing by August 1998.
Commissioning of the plant was delayed to October 1998 because of a shortage of suitable specified waste
(with a higher content of hydrocarbons). The one-year management support started from September 1999.
The contract was modified during construction in December 1997 to include facilities for dioxin removal
from effluent gases. The contract construction period of two years was extended by eight months,
accordingly. The construction of structures, installation of equipment, construction supervision by EMC,
and land acquisition proceeded as scheduled without disruptions or problems, with only minor delays in
testing operations of the completed plant. The workmanship is of a very good standard. Special care and
attention were given to environmental requirements such as effluent gases, dust, noise, and disposal of
ashes. EMC has regularly carried out operational monitoring of compliance with EIA during construction
and after the start of operations, and results were included in the semi-annual progress reports. In addition,
the local government and MOE's regional office carry out separate independent environmental monitoring
of the plant. Six months after completion, EMC submitted a report, which summarizes and evaluates data
collected during the one-year environmental monitoring program, which began six months prior to the start
of operations. The report shows that the plant performs satisfactorily and complies with environmental
regulations.
Financially, Kunsan has been in a deficit situation from the start of operations as a consequence of the
tariff levels set up for the sector by MOE. The tariffs reflect general costs of facilities in the country but
are not adapted to the highly sophisticated and costly plant in Kunsan. The current private operator
indicates that it will reduce the deficit with improved efficiency but would not be able to generate revenues
to pay MOE for the full depreciation until the controlled tariffs for specified waste disposal are liberalized.
The Kunsan component fully achieved its physical output objectives. The construction of structures,
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installation of equipment, construction supervision by EMC, and land acquisition proceeded as scheduled
without any disruption or problems. The contractor's training has educated the national staff in the
technical and management aspects of the Kunsan plant. Smooth operations have successfully demonstrated
the performance of the plant. Incineration of specified waste generated in Chunbuk province is carried out
in a strictly controlled way, which eliminates health hazards caused by air contamination The plant secured
landfill is equipped with sophisticated treatment for its leachate and with safety protection against soil and
groundwater contamination.
Pusan component: The construction of Janglim I, as well as the interceptor sewers and associated pumping
stations, was divided into several contracts. The civil works contract was awarded in May 1996, the
electrical contract in December 1997, two civil works contracts for interceptor sewers in February 1998,
the equipment contract in March 1998 and the contract for landscaping in November 2000. The
construction supervision contract was awarded in July 1996. On the basis of the amended designs, Pusan
negotiated changes in civil works, electrical and equipment supply and installation, respective costs and
schedules and concluded all variation orders in March 2000. The structural and mechanical modifications
involved grit chambers, primary settling tanks, aeration tanks, technological equipment, instrumentation,
and construction of a chemical building. The construction workmanship is of a very good standard, and
special care and attention were given to training operational staff.
Pusan regularly carries out operational monitoring of compliance with EIA during construction, and the
results have been included in semi-annual progress reports. Also the Pusan metropolitan government and
separately, the MOE regional office, carry out independent environmental monitoring of the plant. Six
months after completing the plant, Pusan submitted a report, which summarizes and evaluates data
collected during a one-year environmental monitoring program, which began six months prior to the start of
operations. The report shows satisfactory compliance with environmental regulations and satisfactory
plant performance except for nitrogen reduction. The report also indicates that the wastewater quantity
reaching Janglim I and II is about l0O,000m3/d lower than the 500,OOOm3/d projected in the sewerage
master plan. The reasons for this drop of wastewater quantity are not clearly documented, but preliminary
assessments indicate that both the population and industrial wastewater levels are lower than projected.
(Wastewater levels are not specified by sector.)
Pusan component has achieved its output objectives only partly. The plant's three months of test
operations, which started in September 2001, confirmed the plant's design capacity and performance
parameters except for nitrogen reduction. Tertiary treatment and reuse of treated effluent could not
materialize due to the changes in wastewater quality during the Janglim II construction. The management
of digested and de-watered sludge has also not achieved the proposed targets. The financial status of PSD
during construction was satisfactory.
4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of retzurn:
The economic rate of return was not calculated at appraisal for the following two reasons. First, detailed
information regarding the various impacts of the pre-project pollution levels on water quality on users,
including potential damage caused by inappropriate disposal of specific waste, was not readily available
and generation of such data was considered impractical. Second, the methodologies available for
estimating the economic benefits, which would result from protecting or improving the quality of
environment, had many limitations. However, the project facilities clearly contribute to sustained
environmental development, provide consumers and industries with better service in disposing of waste, and
contribute to general improvements in the health and welfare of the population.
- 8 -
Kunsan component: The key benefit is the safe disposal of the most hazardous waste, which would have a
serious adverse impact on the environment and would endanger the population's health if disposed of in
uncontrolled manner or if waste were scattered around the countryside. The Government implemented the
Kunsan component within its 1993 National Waste Disposal Plan as the first integrated specific waste
treatment plant. In accordance with the Plan's goals, Kunsan uses state-of-the-art technology to set
standards for specified waste treatment plants and to serve as a training facility. Accordingly, the design,
location and chosen technology represented the least-cost solution for the task.
Pusan component: For Pusan, the qualitative project benefits identified at appraisal included reducing
health risks for commercial fishing, water sports and recreation from contact with polluted water,
improving air quality by eliminating unpleasant odors, improving the city's overall environment, and
protecting beaches important for tourism. These all proved valid. Benefits from water reuse were not
realized. The revised design of the treatment plant reflects a least-cost approach to achieve the objective of
nutrient removal, which has become critical for the protection of the seaweed farms and natural bird
habitats in the estuary of the Nakdong River.
4.4 Financial rate of return:
Kunsan component: The financial assessment of the entire Specified Waste Treatment Plant follows the
assessment at appraisal. It concludes that from October 1998 through April 200 1, the Kunsan account has
not been able to achieve the agreed financial targets, which were set to produce sufficient revenue to cover
the sum of its total operating expenses. These include (a) direct operation and maintenance costs and
depreciation; and (b) indirect expenses contributed towards the operator's (EMC) headquarters costs. In
April 2001, operations were stopped to allow time for the bidding process that changed the operator from
EMC to a private company. While in earlier years MOE reported losses, for 2002 and 2003 with
operations contracted to the private operator, MOE expects to receive rental payments of approximately
Won 900 million and 1,030 million. These payments, however, are not able to cover the annual
depreciation of the landfill and incinerator, estimated at Won 2,2 12 million. An FRR was not calculated at
appraisal and is not, therefore, calculated for the ICR. Though MOE made efforts to achieve a better
financial performance through the management contract with the private operator, it was not able to
achieve the original financial objectives, partly because waste tariffs have not been adjusted to reflect costs.
MOE is now in the process of drafting new national waste tariff guidelines, which would give treatment
plants more flexibility in determining the tariff levels they charge.
Pusan component: PSD maintained its Sewerage Special Account (SSA) in good financial position
throughout the project. Sewerage tariff levels were adjusted to ensure sufficient revenues are generated to
cover operating costs and depreciation, and provide funds towards its capital expenditure program. The
average tariff has been increased from Won 79/m3 in 1993 to Won 256/m3 in 2001. Contributions of
internally generated funds to investment remained consistently above the 25% target as specified in the
financial covenant. The completion of the Janglim II and the new WTP in Noksan resulted in a significant
increase in operating expenses in 200 1. The average operational cost of Janglim II is around Won 120/m3
during six months of operations, compared to around Won 55/m3 for Janglim I. This is largely attributable
to the increased cost of chemicals used and the sludge removal associated with the process for nutrient
removal, but also to the continuous testing of the new plant. In order to maintain its financial position, the
city raised its wastewater tariff in 2001, by an average of 3 1%. As a result, the financial positions of the
SSA not only remained healthy but actually improved in 2001. The FRR for the Pusan component is
calculated at 7.4%. Key assumptions of the calculation include: (a) tariff increases attributed to the
project, (b) Janglim to reach its treatment capacity by 2020 (instead of 2010 as expected during appraisal)
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and sewerage flow will be distributed evenly between the phases before that. The FRR is quite robust. For
example, even if actual sewerage treatment in Janglim remains at 2001 level with no increase, the FRR will
still be at 6.8%.
4.5 Institutional development inmpact:
Institutional development was not among the project's prime objectives. Both of the project's implementing
and operating institutions had been in existence for some time, had experienced staff, and had established
acceptable management and financial procedures. At the time of appraisal, Bank staff considered important
and included in the project only training of staff involved in the management and operation of newly
provided facilities. While during preparation attempts were made by Bank staff to discuss the involvement
of the private sector with MOE and Pusan City, private sector participation was found premature in Korea
at that time. The current Government policies, however, encourage private sector participation in both the
development and operation of public services facilities. Accordingly, MOE contracted operations of the
Kunsan plant to a private operator. Pusan decided to reduce its direct involvement in operations of
facilities, and for that purpose, created a municipal enterprise, the Pusan Environmental Installation
Corporation (PEIC), responsible for operations and maintenance of the city's wastewater treatment plants.
(More on PEIC is provided below.)
Kunsan component: In 2000 MOE studied the status of specified waste facilities in the country and
concluded that the legal framework governing the generation, transport and disposal of specified waste had
had a decisive, positive impact on the protection of the environment. It also found that the private
operators of specified waste facilities had gained experience and could provide acceptable guarantees for
controlled transport and disposal of specified waste. With those findings, MOE decided to terminate the
management contract with EMC and off-load its four treatment plants, (Hwasung, Onsan, Kwangyang and
Kunsan), to interested private companies. There were no bidders for the purchase of the plants in the first
round. A new round of bidding was, therefore, opened for their management. In this second round, two
bidders were pre-qualified and the contract was awarded in June 2001 to a joint venture of two companies,
one being the resident and providing environmental service in Kunsan town while the partner is experienced
in managing residential waste incinerators in Korea. During the take-over period, the operator tested the
Kunsan incinerator functions for about two months. At the same time, specialized laboratories confirmed
its environmental performance as satisfactory. Normal operations started in May 2002, after some
technological parts were replaced. To ensure that the technological process is followed, MOE has arranged
for the presence of EMC staff trained by the incinerator contractor to, in turn, train the private operator to
manage the equipment during the early stages of the new operations.
Pusan component: There were two reasons leading to the creation of the Pusan Environmental Installation
Corporation (PEIC): the city's need to reduce municipality staff on one hand, and the need for
uninterrupted availability of specially trained operational staff at treatment facilities on the other. The
latter could not be achieved with municipal terms of employment Linder which periodic movement between
departments is required. For these very reasons, Pusan had already created other municipal corporations,
such as a health corporation (hospitals), a land and housing corporation (municipal housing), and a
facilities corporation (street cleaning, parks). Following that pattern, the Mayor established the PEIC by
decree in January 2000. The responsibilities for managing the wastewater treatment plants and associated
interceptor sewers, nightsoil treatment plant, and solid waste incinerator were transferred to PEIC from
Pusan's Environmental Bureau. PEIC operates under a budget approved by Pusan (Won 34.5 billion in
2001 and Won 42.7 billion in 2002) and financed from wastewater and solid waste revenues. Its current
staff of about 350 manages four municipal wastewater treatment plants with a total capacity of
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1,700,000m3/d, a nightsoil treatment plant (3,500m3/d), a solid waste incinerator (200t/d), and 250km of
interceptor sewers. The Environmental Bureau and its Sewerage and Waste Divisions remain responsible
for maintaining secondary sewers (through 16 district offices), collecting solid waste (through contractors),
operating sanitary landfills, implementing sector development projects, and collecting sewerage and solid
waste revenues.
Although capacity building was not a major project objective, in view of the strong institutional capacity
demonstrated by the implementing agencies of each component, the rating given is substantial.
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome
5. 1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency.
Since the completion of the Kunsan plant in August 1998, the plant has been operated only sporadically
because of shortages of specified waste resulting from reductions due to the recent Asia economic crisis
and reduced industrial production in the Kunsan Industrial Complex. For example, the Daewoo
Automobile Plant, located in the Industrial Complex has been closed since 1998. During 1998 and early
1999, local civic groups resisted the importation of specified waste from other provinces. Subsequently,
the plant incurred substantial financial losses from the start of its operations until its transfer to a private
operator in November 200 1.
Local civil resistance caused a series of delays during preparation and especially operations. Total
stoppages of plant operations are estimated at over two years. The Kunsan Resident Support Committee
(KRSC), representing the collective management of 16 smaller NGOs was involved in the project since the
early planning stages, through early review of the environmental impact assessment and later the
construction phase. While the discussions may have delayed construction, major difficulties arose at the
start of EMC operations when the KRSC opposed the importation of specified waste from other provinces.
Finally after lengthy discussions, the KRSC agreed to the importation, subject to receiving substantial
payments related to the volume of the imports. The situation was repeated after MOE concluded a contract
with a private operator. In August 2001 the KRSC succeeded in obtaining a court order for MOE to stop
plant operations. Following the court settlement, the MOE/operator agreed to regular payments related to
the volume of waste, periodic monitoring of the plant's performance by KRSC's experts, and permanent
presence of a KRSC representative in the plant to verify operations. The estimated USS2.0 million
collected by KRSC so far in connection with Kunsan specified waste plant has reportedly been used mainly
for administrative expenses of area NGOs and scholarships of Kunsan students.
5.2 Factors generally subject to government control.
In 1997, shortly before completing the plant, MOE issued stricter environmental regulations concerning
the dioxin levels permitted in incinerator exhaust gas. That necessitated a halt in on-going construction,
redesign of respective equipment, modification of the contract, manufacturing and installation of new
equipment. The process resulted in increased costs (US$4.0 million) and a lo-month delay in completion
of plant (October 1998 instead of December 1997). MOE's decision to privatize management of the
specified waste facilities reduced the Government's financial losses while maintaining acceptable standards
of service. Further improvements may follow after the specified waste tariffs are liberalized.
5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:
In the early 1990's Pusan started numerous major in frastructure projects in transportation, water supply,
sewerage, solid waste and other sectors. The capital requirements exceeded the amounts planned, and in
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1995 Pusan City experienced serious budgetary constraints. It realized that it would be difficult to
support Janglim construction as agreed in the appraised financial projections. Upon lengthy review, Pusan
finally decided to carry on with the construction of Janglim II but with a more protracted implementation
schedule. The review also contributed to delays in declaring Loan effectiveness. (While the Loan
Agreement was signed in March 1995, Pusan ratified the Project Agreement only in October 1995, making
the project effective about four months later than planned.) And, in accordance with the City's decision,
the start of construction of the Janglim WTP was delayed. Instead of starting in January 1995, the first
civil works contract was awarded in May 1996, 17 months later than planned.
Another major factor affecting implementation was the unexpected change in wastewater quality arriving
in Janglim I after starting construction of Janglim II, as a result of expansion of interceptor sewers in the
catchment and connection of additional industries. The planning studies, the sewerage master plan for
Pusan and the feasibility study of Janglim 11 had projected growth of industrial wastewater, but with regard
to quality the projections assumed greater dilution after mixing with residential wastewater. The feasibility
study also assumed that the municipality-forced transfer of most polluting industries from janglim to the
new specialized industrial estate at Noksan, west of the Nakdong River, would have a positive impact on
wastewater quality in the Janglim catchment. Further, the feasibility study assumed that industrial
discharges would comply with quality standards of effluent accepted in public sewers. Almost none of
these assumptions proved correct. The mixing with residential wastewater has had a lower effect than
expected since population growth was slower than projected. Only a few industrial plants were relocated to
Noksan estate with little effect on wastewater quality in the Janglim catchment. And finally, the
manufacturers did not comply with regulations for public sewers. In case of nitrogen for example, the
discharged concentrations are many times higher than allowed by the standards. Control and enforcement
of the regulations are the responsibility of the MOE office and laboratory in Pusan, which has been
informed about the status by the Janglim WTP manager.
5.4 Costs andfinancing:
Kunsan component: The actual estimated cost is Won 29.9 billion (USS28.8 million). Expressed in Won
the actual estimate is 22% higher and in US dollars, 6% lower than the appraisal estimate of Won 24.5
billion (USS30.6 million) due to exchange rate variations. The increase in Won is mainly due to the
contract variation for controlling dioxin in exhaust gas. The Bank loan of $12.2 million financed about
50% of equipment foreign costs. The Government contribution of $16.6 million financed civil works, the
remaining equipment, supervision, land acquisition, and other administrative costs. It also financed about
USS1.55 in interest during construction. Expressed in US dollars, the actual loan amount was 18% lower
and the Government contribution 6% higher than estimated at appraisal.
Pusan component: The actual estimated cost is Won 174.8 billion (US$218.5 million). In both Won and
US dollars, the actual estimate is about 10% lower than the appraisal estimate of Won 194.1 billion
(USS242.6 million). The Bank loan of $41.3 million financed 98% of equipment costs. Pusan's
contribution of USS 177.2 million equivalent financed civil works, supervision, land acquisition, and other
administrative costs. In addition, Pusan financed interest during construction of US$3.82 million in respect
of the Bank loan and another USS9.57 million in respect of the Environmental Fund. Expressed in US
dollars, the actual loan amount and the Government contribution were 3 1% and 2 1% lower than estimated
at appraisal.
Comparison of actual and appraisal estimate slightly distorts the different scopes of work proposed versus
work actually constructed. The actual estimate includes only the construction of Janglim II while the
appraisal estimate includes tertiary treatment for Janglim I and II. On the other hand, the appraisal includes
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a cost estimate for 4.5km of interceptor sewers while about 5.2 km were actually constructed.
The final closing date was extended for a total of 18 months for reasons discussed in the achievements
section and section 5.3.
6. Sustainability
6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:
The project components are likely to be sustainable. All physical assets are completed, successfully tested
and are operational. Clear institutional responsibility and financial viability of the operating agencies and
the technical and professional knowledge of the private operator in Kunsan and PEIC in Pusan will ensure
high operational standards and eminent performance of facilities provided by the project. The
Government's commitment to better environmental protection combined with public interests and controls
confirm the high probability of the project's sustainability.
Kunsan component: Improvements in Korea's economy and accelerating industrial activity have begun to
increase the amount of specified waste for disposal. A considerable quantity of specified waste disposed
earlier in an uncontrolled manner is now directed to specified waste plants as a result of a February 1999
amendment to the Waste Disposal Act and accompanying strengthening of enforcement capacity. These
new conditions create a steady demand, and thus steady business, for the disposal of specified waste,
making it possible for private operators to enter into the sector and to maintain the sustainability of the
Kunsan component.
Pusan component: Established regular environmental monitoring in the Nakdong Estuary, supported by
steady pressure from independent citizen groups, in combination with a permanent flow of wastewater in
the plant provide adequate incentives for keeping the plant in a good state of repair and maintaining a high
performance. PEIC, the operating agency, manages three major and a number of smaller wastewater
treatment plants including associated interceptor sewers and pumping stations. Expansion of the Janglim
plant represents only 11% of total treatment capacity in the city, and is easily absorbed within the
wastewater management organization. The positive sewerage tariff policy supports financial viability of
PEIC and contributes to the likelihood of the component's sustainability.
6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations.
The staff involved in managing and operating the facilities were trained during the test operations of
completed works. In the case of Kunsan, the contractor provided operational support for one year of
operations, even when the operations were irregular due to a lack of specified waste and its unfavorable
(non-calorific) composition. In the case of Pusan the test operations with intensive training of staff under
various flows and quantity conditions were carried out for three months.
7. Bank and Borrower Performance
Bank
7.1 Lending.
Bank identification of the project was satisfactory. The CAS and graduation plan for Korea had identified
the urban environment, specifically waste disposal, as an area where the Bank's expertise would be
desirable, and the project was ably targeted toward that sector. The design of the Kunsan and Pusan
components correctly reflected the Bank's dialogue with the Government on sector policy. The design was
not overly complex, especially given the strong capacity of the implementing agencies.
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The Bank's performance in preparation was satisfactory. The Bank provided professional guidance to the
implementing agencies. The implementing agencies assisted by consultants they selected and financed
carried out preparation studies and designs. Bank reviews of studies resulted in selecting a lower capacity
for incinerator from the one considered as an alternative in Kunsan and in a decision for water conservation
instead of discharging wastewater through a long sea outfall in Pusan. The Bank gave sound guidance on
the production of the environmental assessments and reviewed them for compliance with safeguard policy.
They were also reviewed and approved by MOE, and summaries were made available to the Board before
appraisal.
The Bank's appraisal was comprehensive, extensively addressing all aspects of the components which
were all in an advanced stage of preparation with the exception of Pusan tertiary treatment documented
only in preliminary outline. The Bank's appraisal mission was necessarily heavily staffed with technical
specialists: two sanitary engineers, a municipal engineer, an incineration specialist, an environmental
specialist, and a financial analyst. The appraisal correctly assessed the strong commitment of the
Government and implementing agencies, including the regulatory environment, incentives to sustain the
project, and allocation of staff and resources for implementation. No significant risks were expected during
the project execution. The Bank's safeguard policies were appropriately taken into consideration, including
setting of detailed monitoring systems for controls of physical performance, financial viability of agencies,
and environment protection actions. Lessons from previous Bank lending in the sector and in Korea were
taken into consideration. For example, the Annual Review on Evaluation Reviews, OED August 1992,
states that, ". ..well defined objectives, with regard to project targets and commitment of responsible
agencies, contributed to the success." Based on this lesson the proposed project's objectives focused on key
physical and institutional goals and the project team ensured firm support from implementing agencies.
Project processing was relatively rapid, extending over a 12 month period, including negotiations in the
field following appraisal.
7.2 Supervision:
Bank performance during supervision was satisfactory. Supervision missions were appropriately spaced
during the project's life although a few more in 1997-1998 might have been beneficial. The missions were
adequately focused and provided sound professional guidance to the implementing agencies. One team
member, a procurement-accredited sanitary engineer, worked closely on the project from preparation
through completion, lending much needed consistency for both the Bank and especially the Borrower, in the
face of numerous task manager changes. The Bank's supervision missions reviewed the Borrower's
progress reports in great detail, held discussions with the implementing agencies and followed up
appropriately in action letters. Mission reporting in project status reports was adequately detailed and gave
realistic performance ratings. Proposed revisions of components (dioxin facility in Kunsan and treatment
process in Pusan) were extensively reviewed and discussed with the proposing agencies prior to providing
no objections. There were no deviations from Bank policies or procedures during implementation.
Procurement revisions of both Kunsan and Pusan were complicated and took much longer than would be
normally expected. In Kunsan the procurement involved two-stage bidding for turn-key construction of
specialized incinerator and in Pusan the lowest evaluated bidder for treatment plant equipment belonged to
the same holding company as the consulting firm, which prepared feasibility study and preliminary designs.
In the first case the implementing agency has had no experience with two-stage bidding resulting in some
misunderstanding of regulations, which required clarifications before the Bank issued its no objection to the
recommended bidder. In the second case, after long discussions, Pusan finally accepted the Bank's rules
and selected the second lowest evaluated bidder
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7.3 Overall Bank performance:
Overall, the Bank performance during preparation and implementation contributed to completion of a
generally successful project within the projected costs, within an extended schedule. In sumrnary its
performance is rated satisfactory.
Borrower
7.4 Prepara tion
The borrower's performance during preparation was satisfactory. With intensive Government support and
consultant assistance the implementing agencies prepared the project for appraisal within 12 months of
identification. Technical reports and proposals were of high professional quality and design parameters
were acceptable. Except for Pusan tertiary treatment alternative, which was decided shortly before
appraisal, all components were in an advanced state of preparation and were of very good quality. The
implementing agencies were fully committed to the project and allocated adequate staff and resources to
project formulation and preparation.
7.5 Government implementation performance.
Government performance throughout implementation was satisfactory. It provided general guidance and
assistance in the areas of financing, environment and procurement. Commitments and agreements reached
on various aspects of the project during preparation were respected and the Bank's regulations and
procedures were fully complied with. The Government ministries also helped coordinate the implementing
agencies with Bank supervision missions.
7.6 Implementing Agency:
The performance of both implementing agencies was satisfactory. Both agencies successfully supervised
and implemented their components within the agreed costs, performance parameters and a slightly extended
timeframe. They also complied with the conditions stipulated in the Loan Agreement with some exception,
essentially beyond the control of the agencies (Kunsan financial performance resulting from factors beyond
EMC control, and Pusan's complex issues of change in wastewater quality, tertiary treatment and reuse of
treated effluent). Semi-annual progress reports and annual audit reports were submitted to the Bank in the
required time and were of high quality. The Borrower's contributions to the Implementation Completion
Report were submitted to the Bank on time as required.
7.7 Overall Borrower performance:
Overall, the Borrower's performance was satisfactory. From the start of preparation through physical
completion of the facilities the Government and the implementing agencies demonstrated high commitment
to the objectives of the project, and while stressing project ownership, they fully respected Bank policies
and requirements.
8. Lessons Learned
The main lessons learned from the design and implementation of the project are the following.
a) Protection of the environment is expensive as documented in both Kunsan and Pusan. To avoid
excessive costs, the technical alternatives and their impacts should be thoroughly evaluated and discussed
by both the environment protection agent and the initiating investor in order to find the least-cost solution
for the society, and not just a solution capable of meeting maximum environmental requirements.
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b) Private operators of environmental facilities are, contrary to popular belief, less likely to be
exposed to pressures from various local civic groups than the Government. Currently, in Korea there
are about 130 incinerators for specified waste, but only Kunsan is owned by the Government. Thus far,
only Kunsan has been exposed to systematic demands from local civic groups for various payments, with
arguments pertaining to the protection of public health. This is likely because the Government is much
more sensitive to negative exposure in the press or at staged meetings than are private operators.
c) The expansion of interceptor sewers in Pusan was guided by environmental considerations,
requiring all generators of wastewater to be connected to the sewerage network. The legal-commercial
aspects of the sewerage service, requiring a contract between the service provider and the beneficiary,
including permission for the quantity and the quality of wastewater, was not pursued. This contractual
relationship should be pursued to enable more efficient and better quality treatment.
d) A municipal land use policy and urban planning blueprint should be completed and available
prior to designing any wastewater treatment plant. This principle is all the more important for mixed
residential and industrial areas, and should include enforcement of zoning and environmental regulations
concerning the use and discharge of wastewater. Future feasibility studies of wastewater systems should
include a detailed assessment of land use plans and enforcement of respective regulations.
9. Partner Comments
(a) Borrower/implementing agencv:
The following email was received from the Government of Korea on June 24, 2002:
"Dear Ming Zhang
Thank you for your cooperation and the Bank's contribution to
successful completion of the project(IBRD 3830-KO)
I inform you that we have no further comments on the draft ICR.
Meanwhile, In spite of completion of the project and no plan to
withdraw undisbursed loan amount($5,531,791.02), the undisbursed loan
proceeds have not cancelled yet. (Please find the attached file) Would you
let me know how the undisbursed loan amounts will be proceeded or settled?
I am looking forward to hearing from you soon. Thank you in advance for
your cooperation.
Best Regards
Lee"
(b) Cofinanciers:
N/A
(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):
N/A
10. Additional Information
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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix
Outcome I Imoact Indicators:
IndicatoriMatrix Prolected in last PSR' ActualtLatest Estimate
KUNSAN COMPONENT
Disposal of specified waste generated in The incinerator disposes 60 Vd of specified The incinerator disposes 60-90 t/d of
-hunbuk province and elsewhere through waste specified waste from Chunbuk province and
ncneration in Kunsan. elsewhere
The Kunsan plant' revenues covers The Kunsan plant revenues to cover
operating and indirect expenses and operation and indirect expenses and In 1998-2001 MOE incurred losses about W
depreciation depreciation 9,3 billion In 2002-03 MOE expects from
private operator rental payments ol W 1,930
mill. Since this payment does not cover
depreciation of the plant of W 2,212 million
MOE will incur further losses,
Training of incineration management and Incineration plant management and operation
)perational staff slaff fully trained The contractor provided training of EMC staff
in operation of incinerator EMC trained staff
ransfered its skills to the current private
operator
'USAN COMPONENT
Reduction of organic pollution expressed as Janglim plant (I+ll=615,000m3/d) removes Janglim I (330,000m3/d) not yet modified
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and of pollution equivalent to BOD=60 t/d and SS= Janglim II capacity (285,000m3/d) would
suspended solids (SS) in Nakdong River 109 Vd from wastewater remove pollution equivalent to BOD=4OVd
-Stuary and SS=67Vd from wastewater
zusan sewerage revenues contribution to Contribution from revenues to capital Actual contibution varied from 31 00% to
,apital expenditures expenditures not less than 25% 59 60% between 1995 through 2001
Reuse of treated efflUenlt reaches about 10% Changed wastewater quality cannot be
Reuse ol Janglim ueatment plant effluent in of Janglim I and 11 combined capacity teated by combination of secondary- tertiary
ndustries as cooling, washing, and technology as proposed. Suitable modified
echnological water treatment process replaced the initial tertiary
treatment only in Janglim II Further polishing
of effluent can proceed only when the
process is constructed in Jangim I.
Output Indicators:
Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR' Actual/Latest Estimate
KUNSAN COMPONENT
Incinerator for specified waste is constructed Incineralor for specified waste with capacity Incinerator with capacity ol
in Kunsan of 60 dday is constructed in Kunsan 60 to d of specified waste is compteted and in
operation by private operator company in
Kunsan
PUSAN COMPONENT
Janglrm II wastewater treatment plant is Construction of Janglim II wastewater Janglim II plant with capacity of 285,000
constructed in Pusan treatment plant with capacity of 285,000 m3/d m3/d is completed and in operation
Tertiary treatment of Janglim wastewater ConstrucUon of tertiary treatment for Janglim Construction ol tertiary treatment has been
treatment plant is constructed in Pusan I and 11 combined capacity of 615,000 m31d postponed and its technology will be
determined after the Janglim I impact on
environment is evaluated
End of project
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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing
Project Cost by Component (in USS million equivalent)
Appraisal Actua l/Latest Percentage of
Estimate Estimate Appraisal
Project Cost By Component US$ million US$ million
Treatment Plant 153.73 210.53 137
Tertiary Treatment 55.92 0.00 0
Project Support 4.82 11.15 231
Land Acquisition & Compensation 24.5 1 25.61 104
Total Baseline Cost 238.98 247.29
Physical Contingencies 10.7 2
Price Contingencies 23.55
Total Project Costs 273.25 247.29
Interest during construction 31.85 5.37 17.00
Total Financing Required 305.10 252.66
Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)
Procurement Method'Expenditure Category ICB NCB Other N.B.F. Total Cost
1. Works 2.50 0.00 0.00 134.61 137.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2. Goods 102.33 3.00 0.00 0.00 105.33
(73.00) (2.00) (0.00) (0.00) (75.00)
.3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.69 5.69
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
4. Land Acquisition 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.13 25.13
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total 104.83 3.00 0.00 165.43 273.26
(73.00) (2.00) (0.00) (0.00) (75.00)
Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (ActuallLatest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)
Procurement Method'1Expenditure Category ICB NCB Other N.B.F. Total Cost
1. Works 0.00 0.00 139.30 139.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2. Goods 64.51 0.00 0.00 1.71 66.22
(53.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (53.48)
3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.15 17.15
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I___ __ _ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
4. Land Acquisition 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.61 24.61
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total 64.51 0.00 0.00 182.77 247.28
(53.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (53.48)
Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.
b Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff
of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i)
managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.
Project Financing by C mponent (in US$ million equiv alent)
Percentage of Appraisal
Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate
Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF.
Kunsan 15.00 16.18 12.21 18.17 81.4 112.3
Pusan 60.00 213.92 41.27 190.58 68.8 89.1
The above costs include interest during construction and a loan from the Environmental Fund.
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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits
No ERR was calculated at appraisal for reasons given in section 4.3.
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Annex 4. Bank Inputs
a) Missions:
Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating
(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) llmplementatior Development
Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective
Appraisal/Negotiation
Appraisal: 6 2 Sanitary Engineers, I
October 1994 Municipal Engineer, 1
Incineration Specialist, 1
Environmental Specialist, 1
Financial Analyst
Supervision
May 1996 3 2 Sanitary Engineers, 1 S S
Financial Analyst
May 1997 2 1 Sanitary Engineer, 1 Financial S S
Analyst
May 1998 4 1 Municipal Engineer, I S S
Financial Analyst, 2
Environmental Specialists
January 1999 3 1 Financial Analyst, 1 S S
Environmental Specialist, 1
Sanitary Engineer
August 1999 3 1 Financial Analyst, I S S
Economist, 1 Sanitary Engineer
October 2000 2 1 Economist, 1 Environmental S S
Specialist
April 2001 2 1 Sanitary Engineer, 1 S S
Environmental Specialist
October 200 1 2 I Economist, 1 Environmental S S
Specialist
ICR
April 2002 4 1 Economist, 1 Sanitary S S
Engineer, 1 Environmental
Specialist, 1 Translator
(b) Staff
Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate
No. Staff weeks US$ ( 000)
Appraisal/Negotiation 304.0 346.5
Supervision 145.4 234.7
ICR 9.5 59.1
Total 458.9 640.3
Cost incurred up to and including FY99 were increased 15% to take into account changes in accounting
practices starting in FYOO.
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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components
(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)
Rating
g Macro policies O H O SU O M O N * NA
B Sector Policies 0 H OSU O M ON * NA
G Physical OH * SUCW ON O NA
O Financial O H CSU*M O N O NA
D Institutional Development 0 H O SUO M 0 N 0 NA
E Environmental OH *SUOM ON O NA
O Poverty Reduction O H 0 SU 0 M Fb.' * e
E Gender OH O SU O M ON * NA
O Other (Please specify) OH OSUOM 0 N * NA
O Private sector development O H 0 SU 0 M O N * NA
Pi Public sector management OH OSU OM ON * NA
E Other (Please specify) OH O su 0 M O NO NA
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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance
(I-IS-Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)
6. 1 Bank performance Rating
1 Lending OHS OS OU OHU
LI Supervision O HS O S O U O HU
Z Overall OHS OS O U 0 HU
4.2 Borrower performance Rating
L Preparation OHS *S OU O HU
L Government implementation performance O HS OS 0 U 0 HU
0] Implementation agency performance OHS OS OU O HU
U] Overall OHS OS O U O HU
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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents
1. Report on Investigation of the Environmental Effect 1997- 1998 (Kunsan Treatment Plant), prepared by
the Environmental Management Corporation, Korea, May 1998.
2. The Construction of the Second Extension of Janglim Sewage Treatment Plant: Report on the
Examination of the Post Construction Environmental Effects, prepared by the Construction Headquarters
of Pusan Metropolitan City, March 2002
3. Staff Appraisal Report, No. 13570-KO of November 14, 1994
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Additional Annex 8.Monit oring Indicators for Kunsan and Pusan Components
KUNSAN:
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Item 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Actual
1 .Waste treated
(Wy)
-Landfill Chunbuk 5 43 5,200
409
Outside 0 0
Total 10,755 9,912 8,769 3,260 5,430 5,200 409
-Incinerat Chunbuk 2,335 4,099
0
Outside 2,838 9,672
0
Total a)432 5,173 13,771
6629
2.Average tariff
(Won)
-Landfill 57.000 8 1,000 86,400 86,400 79,374 85,000 85,000
-Incineration _ 65,000 67,272 59,037 59,000
3.Personnel
(number)
-Landfill 3 3 3
-Incineration 35 32
23
Total t917 15 38 38 35 26
4.Revenues (Won
-Landfill 431 442 35
-Incineration 348 813
391
-Non-operat. 6 11
Revenues
0
Total 615 805 883 282 785 1,266 426
5. Operating
Expenses (Won
million)
-Personnel costs 1,229 1,383
-Operational costs 689 1,700
-Depreciation 206 114
-Interest on loans
-Subsidy to public 173 310
Total Op. Expenses 1.573 1,931 1,832 2,391 2,297 3,507 , 910
&Operational -958 -1,126 -949 -2,109 -1,512 -2,24 i 484
Profit (Loss) -,2
26 
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Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1. Physical
parameters
Sewage billed 382,921 396.380 392,597 370.494 380,417 366.923 353,053.
1,000 m3/year
Number of sewer 311 313 329 2)318 317 320 350
connections '000
Length (km) of 4,975 5,026 5,140 5,346 5,479 5,612 5,755
combined sewers
Length (km) of 800 950 1,120 1,270 1,284 1,290 1,295
separate sewers
Lengthof 71 119 173 186 194 214
interceptors km
2. Operating
capacity
Days accounts 44 39 42 40.3 41 41 41
receivable
Number of 276 283 359 365 353 254 295
employees
Employees/ 1000 1.2 1.2 0.92 1.15 1.11 1.04 1.04
connections
3. Financial
parameters
Average 100.03 146.71 185.4 185.4 195.64 194.18 255.87
sewerage tariff
Won/m3
Working ratio 0.3 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.31 0.32 0.31
Rate of return 2.18% 4.42% 5.70% 4.00% 2 06% 1.64% 3.08%
Contribution to 33.20% 59.59% 38.27% 45.55% 31 00% 37.30°/o 38%
investment
Debt service rano 3.81 5.29 5.97 4 63 1.87 1.38 2.5
4. Capacity of
treatment plant
Janglim '000 330 330 330 330 330 330 615
m3/day
Suyong '000 286 286 550 550 550 550 550
m3/day
Nambu '000 65 65 340 340 340 340 340
m3/day
Other plants 65 65 65 65 65 249
'000 m3/day
Total treatment 681 746 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,754
capacity
5. Performance
of Janglim STP
BOD5 on outlet 12.2 12.3 10.2 11 9.8
mg/l 9R 
Suspended solids 11.6 9.7 9.2 10.3 8.6
on outlet mg/l
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Republic of Korea
May, 2002
1. Introduction
In the course of rapid industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s the amount of waste generated in
Korea brought about social and environmental problems. From the beginning of the 1980s the
Government of the Republic of Korea strengthened its waste disposal policy and established the
National Comprehensive Waste Disposal Plan (NCWDP) in 1993. The basic policy of this plan is
intended to reduce the amount of waste generated; to increase recycling rate on one hand and expand
sanitary landfills and incinerators for safe disposal of waste on the other hand.
This plan also indicates clearly that the central government will take the initiative in controlling specified
waste that is very harmful and hard to dispose of and the local governments construct household waste
treatment facilities. The Kunsan Specified Waste Treatment (KTP) constructed based on this plan is
composed of a sanitary landfill in operation since March 1995 and the Kunsan Specified Waste
Incinerate (SWI) built in accordance with the Kunsan Project.
In 1993 the government decided to push ahead with the Kunsan project by obtaining an IBRD loan,
completed consultation with IRBD about Project implementation in 1994 and signed a Loan Agreement
in March 1995. The agreed loan amount for the Kunsan project at that time was US$15,000,000 but
withdrawal of US$2,776,000 was cancelled in February 1999 due to reduction of the project cost in the
course of its implementation. After bidding on the project and the conclusion of a contract in 1995, the
design, construction and trial run by the SWI were completed during the period of January 1996 to
October 1998.
29-
This evaluation report is an annex to the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) prepared by the
Bank and describes the borrower s evaluation. The Ministry of Environment (MOE) has made out this
report based on the data by the Environmental Management Corporation (EMC), which was the
operator before privatization.
A. Statement l Evaluation of objectives
2. Project Objective
The objective of this Project is to install and operate the SWI (Kunsan Specified Waste Incinerator) with
a loan from IRBD as a part of the National Comprehensive Waste Disposal Plan promoted by the
Ministry of Environment. Environmental pollution may be prevented and a pleasant living environment
can be maintained by treating waste that was generated by industrial facilities with the SWI safely and
properly. Moreover the SWI can effectively treat the specified waste that private treatment facilities find
difficult to dispose of, thus supporting industrial activities. In addition to this SWI being
government-managed facilities can get trust of the local residents who tend to dislike waste treatment
facilities.
3. Project Description
The SWI is designed to be fused by fire such specified wastes as waste oil, waste organic solvent, waste
paint and sludge containing heavy metal. The SWI is located in Kunsan at 230km southwest to Seoul
and constitutes an integral part of the KTP (Kunsan Specified Waste Treatment Plant) with a sanitary
landfill.
Major equipment of the SWI include a storage of liquid and solid waste, pretreatment devices including
a crusher, a rotary kiln incinerator capable of burning upto 60 tons of waste daily and exhaust gas
cooling and treatment devices such as a boiler and electrostatic precipitator, a bag filter and scrubbers.
After being entrusted with the project implementation by the MOE, the EMC proceeded with bidding on
the project and conclusion of a contract completing, the design, construction and trial runs of the SWI
during the period of January 1996 to October 1998. Details of the project include the plant operational
support to be after completion.
B. Achievement of Objectives
4. Physical Objective
The project's physical objective was substantially achieved. The physical component of the project is
composed of designing, purchasing, installing and operating a waste incinerator with a daily capacity of
60 tons. On behalf of the EMC, the Office of Supply, the government of the Republic of Korea took
charge of the bidding and concluded a contract with the joint venture of French SARP and Korean
Hyundai Heavy Industry on turn-key basis which is advantageous for performance guarantee of the
incinerator. After the conclusion of the contract, the EMC directly performed supervision during the
period of design and construction reflecting its experiences of installing and operating other incinerators.
The contractor did not have any difficulty either in designing and installing the incinerator in terms of
technical aspect.
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The construction work was initially scheduled for completion by the end of 1997 but was delayed to
October 1998 because additional facilities had to be installed due to change of design. Since the
contract for change of design was concluded, when the original work was almost completed, the
construction period had to be extended considerably for designing the additional facilities, importing
overseas materials and installing them. Therefore, the extension was minimized. Trial runs also had to
be delayed but performance inspections found the amount of waste treated and exhaust gas measurement
satisfactory.
Overall, comnmercial operation was delayed due to civil petitions after completion of the facilities in
October 1998 and the Plant Operational Support for normal operation to be provided by the contractor
had to be delayed, installation and trial runs were completed without serious problems except for some
extension of the construction period.
5. Financial Objective
The MOE, the owner of the SWI, entrusted the EMC with the operation, maintenance and repair of the
SWI including the financial matters arising from the operation. However, normal operation of treatment
facilities was impossible for a long time due to civil petitions. It was argued that area resident should set
a limit of waste imported from outside to the treatment facilities in Jeollabukdo. However, domestic
waste was already being treated by the existing civilian treatment company, and there was little locally
generated industrial waste. Therefore the waste of 18,000 tons of the year, which is necessary for the
normal operation of the incinerator, could not be secured. With this, the EMC concluded agreement with
the area resident to cancel the area waste import regulation (1999.7.6). By the agreement conclusion, the
EMC could secure specified waste for incineration, which is necessary for the treatment facilities
operation, but the financial objective improvement could not be achieved. Because, the resident
interfered everything in the treatment facilities management and demanded a treatment facilities
management standard much stricter than the related law, as a condition to cancel the area carrying-in
limitation. Also, the resident have the authority that can make powerful penalty such as the treatment
facilities closure action and require resident support money very excessively if the EMC were not
conforming to this standard. After all, it recorded a management deficit above 2 billion Korean Won
every year being opposite to the original plan at first, which was set to return the principal and interest
accrual needed for the treatment facilities construction by operating income.
The treatment facilities became entrusted to the private sector operator on June 28th, 2001 with the
public facilities privatization plan of the Korean government. The reasons of the negative financial
results were compounded results of the opposition of the resident, the condition of location and the
inefficient operation of the EMC, etc. The Kunsan Waste Treatment Facilities is located too remote
from the place where wastes are generated and the shipping charges were expensive. By the reason, this
plant fell behind the other plants in cost performance. The EMC is possessing human power who are
very excellent about the operating technology of the treatment facilities in the public corporation which
manages environment facilities. Also the EMC is possessing technical experiences, but it was evaluated
that the public corporation fall behind in the competitiveness comparing to the private company about
the specified waste treatment operation, which should do a marketing activity. In the end, the Korean
government entrusted this treatment facility to the Future & Environment Inc. instead of the EMC of the
public organization to manage it. This is a point which the bank must consider very carefully, in its
promotion of similar projects in other countries in the future. The SWI processed about 25,000 tons
specified waste which contained 1,550 tons during the period of before trial runs.
6. Environmental Objective
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The project's environmental objective was partially achieved.
The environmental objective is to prevent environmental pollution by treating specified waste generated
by industrial facilities safely and properly. The SWI has treated about 25,000 tons specified waste
including 1,550 tons from trial runs. It has proved to have no effect on its surrounding environment
according to the exhaust gas measurement and environmental influence investigation was conducted. In
order to investigate the surrounding environmental state during the construction period and before
operation of the incinerator, air quality, odors, noise and vibration were surveyed from December 1997
to May 1998 and the results were presented to the bank. In the latter half of 1999 when the incinerator
is expected to operate normally another environmental influence investigation will be conducted for
comparative analysis of the surrounding environmental states before and after operating the incinerator.
Moreover, an automatic exhaust gas-measuring device will be operated during the operation of the
incinerator to monitor any effect on the surrounding environment.
Even though the incinerator could not be operated for some time after completion, wastes were brought
in continuously for pretreatment and storage, and some specified wastes neglected by bankrupt
enterprises were brought in the plant at the request of the MOE, thus preventing environmental
pollution.
7. Policy Improvement
In Korea, local governments are in charge of treating and controlling ordinary household garbage and
central government is in charge of treating and controlling specified waste. At one time, for the purpose
of treating the unmanageable specified waste in the private department, the Korean government installed
the specified waste treatment facilities, which contained the KTP in the nationwide 5 areas and managed
it. Recently the Korean government sold these to the private company or entrusted its management to the
private sector. The specified waste public treatment facilities, which the public company managed so
far, can be entrusted to the private sector. This is due to the judgement that the policy of the government
to reform state owned companies, and the improvement of the waste throughput of the private company
according to the upbringing of the environment allied industries.
C. Major factors Affecting Implementation
8. Factors Subject to Government Control
One of the major factors is the Government's policy of regulation on exhaust gas. In 1997 dioxin,
which is contained in the pollutants discharged by incinerators, became a social issue. The government
law to regulate the discharge standard of incinerators was revised for the pertinent burning up more than
50 tons of household garbage daily in response to the request of the citizens and social organizations.
When the law was revised, the construction work of Kunsan Specified Waste Incinerator was almost
completed, but the MOE instructed the EMC to carry out additional work to install devices to reduce
dioxin to cope with the regulation on the dioxin discharge. With this reason the construction period of
Kunsan Specified Waste Incinerator was extended to October 1998 from the end of 1997 and the MOE
invested an additional 5 billion Korean Won. At present new regulations on the discharge of dioxin by
incinerator of the specified waste are in making.
Another factor that affected the project implementation is civil petitions. At the planning stage of the
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SWI in 1994 its scale was estimated assuming that waste would increase. However, the amount of waste
generated in Jeollabukdo was decreased due to change in the legal waste separation system, increased
reutilization and delayed developing the industrial complex in the neighborhood.
In order to ensure stable operation of the SWI, the MOE planned to bring in the waste generated at other
location including Jeollabukdo for a limited period but the resident opposing to operate the incinerator
distrusted this plan. As a matter of fact, there were no legal problems involved in bringing in the waste,
but it was impossible to ignore the opinions of local residents in operating the public specified waste
treatment plant. After several months of consultations with local residents, the MOE finally succeeded
in convincing them of the necessity to bring in waste generated elsewhere and the safety of the
incinerator and obtained their agreement. In the course of the negotiation, promises were made to
conduct environmental influence assessment and various supper measures for local residents. The
continuous dialogues seem to be necessary for normal operation of the plant.
Even though the EMC is entrusted with the operation of the SWI by the MOE, the important matters
related to operate including execution of operational budget funds, adjustment of operating personnel etc
are subject to the approval of the MOE. The SWI is required to follow the operating policy of the MOE
like other specified Waste treatment plants and to observe the obligations related to the loan.
9. Factors Subject to Implementing Agency Control
Entrusted by the MOE, the EMC has actually conducted design, construction, trial runs and commercial
operation of the SWI. When construction work was underway the EMC carried out design change with
the approval of the MOE. EMC delayed trial runs, as it failed to secure an adequate amount of waste
and this was caused by the fact that the establishments discharging higher calorific power waste
specified in the construction contract reduced its amount due to economic slowdown and reutilization
was increased in the contrary.
In order to pay construction cost EMC submitted the request for withdrawal regularly to the IBRD and
cancelled the withdrawal of some amount of the loan as requirements for the loan decreased due to
appreciation of the Korean Won when the project was carried out.
D. Bank Performance
10. The bank's performance during project identification, preparation, appraisal and supervision was
satisfactory in general.
The bank's bidding and procurement guideline requires that important matters related to project
performance such as the contract basis, the selection of successful bidders at bidding stage must be
approved by the bank. In case of the Kunsan Project the bank spent several months reviewing a certain
stage of bidding when it took long time and it would be helpful for adjusting the schedule of succeeding
work if the bank advises estimated approval date in advance. Even though performance of the bank was
satisfactory in general, it came to light that more detailed information on the procedure for withdrawal
of the loan and the time required is an important factor for project performance.
Sufficient consultation seems to have been made during the period of project performance but changed
conditions from the initial appraisal stage seem to require consideration when the performance of the
remaining project is appraised.
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E. Borrower Performance
11. Generally the borrower performance was satisfactory.
Overall, the construction of the incinerator was completed successfully despite the construction period
was extended due to additional facilities to reduce dioxin. Difficulties were encountered during the
construction work and before normal operation but agreement made with local residents makes it
possible to predict normal operation in future.
Maximum cooperation was extended in presenting the data requested by the bank concerning project
performance during the period of the bank's project identification, preparation assistance, appraisal and
supervision. The obligatory matters specified in the loan agreement such as the semi-annual report,
audited financial statement and environmental monitoring report were faithfully submitted.
F. Assessment of Outcome
12.As indicated in the previous chapter of Achievement of objectives the project results arc partially
unsatisfactory.
As the SWI has never been operated normally since its completion, the evaluation of the project results
can be made when the SWI operates normally.
G. Future Operation
13. The EMC is entrusted with the operation of 4 specified waste treatment plants constructed by the
MOE including the KTP.
Proxy Contract Agreement for installation and operation of the SWI was concluded between the MOE
and the EMC in July 1995 and presented to the bank during the period of project appraisal. In addition
to the above contract the MOE informed officially that the EMC should manage and operate various
facilities of the completed SWI in accordance with the National Property Act. According to this
notification, the EMC was commissioned to conduct all operating matters including operation,
maintenance, repair and levy of treatment charges, and intend to prepare the audited financial statement
and conduct environmental monitoring program stipulated in the loan agreement.
In terms of technical aspect of the operation of the SWI, no difficulty is expected for future commercial
operation, because most of the operating personnel of the EMC participated in trial runs and have
experiences of operating similar incinerators. The plant operational support to be provided by the
SARP, the contractor, for a year will contribute greatly to the plant operation.
In terms of financial aspect of the operation of the SWI, It is required to the EMC that it was possible to
become the black-ink management according to the management plan of the MOE. However, the EMC
could not cross the opposite plea of the residents and a barrier with the corporate culture, which is
peculiar to the public company, therefore recorded deficits every year. This is different management
method from the private company which considers of the profit with the survival of the company. For
that reason, the government entrusted treatment facilities to the civilian to introduce the originality and
the management technique of the private department into the public treatment facilities management.
The management results of the private assignee that operate the treatment in place of EMC cannot be
evaluated, because the management period is too short. However, it is the point that the management
income and expenditure of the treatment facilities was improved greatly. In 200 1, the private assignee
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paid the trust commission about 240,000,000 Korean Won to the treasury by the management for about
4 months. The MOE expects that the trust commission of annual 1.5 billion Korean Won is stored to the
MOE if the treatment plant starts to operate normally. It was greatly improved when comparing with the
management of the EMC, which went into deficits above 2 billions Korean Won every year.
H. Key lessons learned
14. Physical Implementation
Delay in the completion of the facilities caused by change of design is an example. At the planning and
design stage the devices used for reducing ordinary air pollutants and dioxin were reflected to cope with
anticipated strengthening of regulations. However, in case of dioxin it became a serious social issue and
led to a revision of the Environmental Preservation Law requiring much less amount of discharge than
reflected on the design. Therefore, change of design and additional work had to be carried out in the
middle of construction work, delaying the completion date and increasing the cost of construction.
Even though legal and regulatory requirements are satisfied, the demands of local residents affect project
performance greatly. Forecast of such incident, however, is extremely difficult.
15. Financial Implementation
Korean economic downturn and rise in exchange rates affected project finance - the rise in exchange
rates reduced the required amount of the loan in foreign currency but payment in the Korean Won for
the foreign currency denominated contract portion increased. The operating income of the SWI became a
marked decrease. The reasons were the decrease of the waste by the business condition stagnation, the
opposition of the resident and excessive supports to soothe the opposition. Also, the treatment facilities
were located in the distant far too from the place where the waste generated. That reflected a carriage
expense rise and added up the difficulty of the treatment facilities management. On the other hand, the
inflexible management method of the EMC increases expenditures too and that became consequently the
cause to make a deficit in the management of the plant weight. The bank should consider very carefully
these when it finances similar treatment facilities project in the future.
16. Consultation with Local Residents
With the recently heightened interest of the citizens in the environment, the SWI has encountered many
difficulties caused by the local residents protest in the course of its construction and operation like any
other environmental basic facilities. Due to the public nature of the treatment plant, the Kunsan
Specified Waste Treatment Plant could not ignore the opinions of the local residents and it took a long
time to obtain the agreement of the local residents on normal operation of the plant including bringing in
waste from locations other than in Jeollabukdo and so forth. It is judged that continuous efforts have to
be made not only to realize proper and safe operation of treatment plant but also to seek the agreement
of local residents.
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Sewage Treatment Plant ( Pusan Component)
Completion Report of Implementation
(Loan 3830-KO)
October 2001
Pusan Metropolitan City
Republic of Korea
Sewage Treatment Plant (Pusan Component)
Completion Report of Implementation

1. Preface
0 Since the 1960s the environmental pollution covering the surrounding shores, rivers, and
waterways of Pusan Metropolitan City has been in a critical condition due to the fast
industrial development and over density of population. This caused the impossibility to
naturally refine those pollutions themselves, and it is inevitable for Pusan Metropolitan
City to establish a systematical countermeasure to improve the environmental condition.
In order to fundamentally resolve the problems of sewage treatment, Pusan City had once
established a comprehensive countermeasure for the sewage treatment in 1974, and set
up a basic repair project for drainage in 1983 to be completed in 2001. Among those
projects, the city started the First Phase of Janglim sewage treatment plant with capacity
of 330,000 im/day in 1966 and completed in December, 1990. Subsequently the city
began the expansion work of the second Phase of Janglim sewage treatment with
capacity of 285,000m'/day in May, 1996 and finished in September, 2001, thus, which is
totally equipped with the sewage treatment capacity (6 1 5,000n 3/day) enough to cover the
sewage with 59 1I,OOOn'/day occurred in the district of Janglim Sewage Treatment Plant.
0 It had been difficult for Pusan Metropolitan City to acquire the fund for this expansion
work due to locally poor financial condition, and decided to lend IBRD loan with internal
funds. Through the advice of project implementation of IBRD in 1993, the city
concluded the agreement for investment in 1995.
At that time, the agreed amount of Loan for the project was 60,000,000 US dollars, but
the work project could be successfully completed thanks to cost reduction through the
whole process of the project with 4 1,268,208.98 US dollars only.
2. The Purpose of the Project
The project aims to keep up the healthy lives of citizens and higher water quality spread the
shores surrounding the city under the optimal environmental circumstance by introducing
high sewage treatment method for factory waste water and precipitated water from the wastes
together with domestic sewage, through further treatment of T-N comprehensively.
3. Introduction to this Project
This Treatment Plant is located approximately 2 km downstream from the barrage of
Nakdong River with population of 1,064,000 persons within the district of treatment
(A=47.580k1&).
. The capacity of this sewage treatment plant is totally 615,000mn'/day; the existing
capacity of 330,000m'/day and the expansion capacity of 285,000mn3/day which is under
operation after the completion of the project.
. Related to the expansiorn facility, two water pump facilities were newly set up in order to
collect the sewage come from Kamcheon district.
* The method of sewage treatment was originally adopted by a standard activated sludge
system at the time of order. It adopted condensed circulation system capable to treat T-N
against future reinforcement of legal sewage treatment. The change of the method caused
to change the project design during the construction.
Details of facilities are as follows:
General Description of Project Capacity
Existing This Future
Description (1996) Project (2011) Total
(2001)
Daily 45 8,820 504,083 646,227 646,227
Capacity Average
of Daily 536,084 59 1,924 766,491 766,491
sewage Maximum
(ii/d) Hourly 828,727 911,029 1,164,957 1,164,957
Maximum
Project Capacity 330,000 285,000 155,000 770,000
. Description of the Loan Project
Name of Facility Dimensions and Capacity/Quantity
Influent Culvert W2.5m X LlSOm X H2.Om / IEA
Influent Pumps |2,600 x H8.5m (I 00m3/min) / 4EA
Grit Chamber W3.5m X L18.Om X Hl.3m /4 Tanks
Primary Settler W10.8m X L46.5m x H3.2m / 15 Tanks
Bio Reactor Tank W8.Om X L43.Om X H10.4m / 21 Tanks
. Pre Anoxic Tank: Beam, Baffle Remove
- Aeration Tank: Wall Installation
. Post Anoxic Tank : Beam, Baffle Remove
. Anoxie Tank Mixer: 105 Sets
- Internal Circulation Pump: 21 Sets
Final Settler
W10.8m X L63.0m X H3.5m I 15 Tanks
- Installation of Interior Baffle
Gravity Thickener
(Existing) (017.3m X H3.Om / 4 Tanks
. Primary Sludge: 2,436mi/d / 2 Tanks
. Excess Sludge: 2,709m3/d I 2 Tanks
De- Watering
Building W27.5m X L55.Om / 2 floor(Total Area : 3,025m')
- Thickener : 60mn'/hr Centrifugal thickener / 3 EA
De-hydrator: 500kg/EA.hr(High Pressure Type) / 2EA
Chemical Building
W 13.Om X L24.Om x H3.4m
* NaOH Tank: o6.Om X H4.6m / 4 Tanks
Interceptor CH30H Tank: o3.8m x L9.Om I 2 Tanks
c1350-c11,350m / 5.2kni
4. Performance of the Goal
0 Physical Goal
. The physical components of this project included design, construction, purchase and
installation of materials and equipment for the successful undertaking of the project with
285,000mi3/day. The bidding of the project was conducted by the Office of Supply,
Republic of Korea, the engineering and construction work was made by HYUNDAI
Construction Co., Ltd, the technology and equipment made by HYOSUNG Corporation,
and the supervision of the project made by DOHWA Consulting Engineers Co., Ltd.
The contractors could have successfully performed the project in respect to design, work,
and installation technologically without any difficulties through lots of experiences so far.
The construction work was originally designed to be completed in June, 2000 but the
work period was prolonged for 16 months more due to many changes of the project
during the construction. Consequently, the cost of the project was increased. The
construction was able to finish everything under the approval with IBRD for the changes
of the design.
0 Environmental Goal
The environmental goal of the project aims to prevent all the environmental pollutions
adequately and properly through thorough sewage treatment come from the district.
There had been lots of difficulties in operating the sewage treatment plant for the stable
operation of the plant due to variation of water quality owing to inflow higher density of
nitrogen than other plant. One of the reasons is that the plant covers all the treatment of
factory waste-water, precipitated water from the waste simultaneously. However, it could
be successfully cornpleted to operate the trial testing without difficulties through
adjustment of the operation to abide by the regulations for the designated outflow quality.
Reasons of decreasing sewage inflow are the Government's recent strong policy for water
saving and reduction of sewage inflow due to relatively lack of the amount of rainfall in
2001 since the collecting pipe of sewage installed in the area of Janglim Sewage
Treatment is equipped with joining of rain water and sewage.
. Reasons of the consistency of sewage inflow are lack of rainfall, and the improvement of
factory operation in the area of sewage treatment considerably thanks to the economic
improvement in 200 1.
. Although there had been some resistances from the residents living here who were
worrying about environmental pollution such as dust, noise, vibration and bad smelling
during the project, the project was finished without difficulties thanks to the effort of
negotiation with them in advance appropriately.
O Financial Goal
The total project cost required was 296,066 million Won, the breakdown of which consists
of 224,644 million Won of local fund, 58,000 million Won of IBRD fund, and 13,422
million Won of national fund in the aspect of support which were used appropriately for
the successful project.
. As to IBRD fund, it was originally planned to borrow the amount of 60,000,000 US dollars
and then adjusted to 46,800,000 US dollars in September, 2001, through some replaced
by domestic fund with changes of design. The amount of the money drawn by December
3 1, 2001, is 41,268,208 US dollars.
. Pusan Metropolitan City have had a local public corporation to operate the project of
drainage system since 1985, and the cost of drainage is appropriately met with the fee of
utilization of the drainage.
. For the sake of healthy financial operation of local public corporation, the operation of
sewage treatment plant was entrusted to Management Corporation of Environmental
Facilities in 1999, which makes efficient management and control through restructure of
human resources and acquiring professional human resources.
5. The Role of the Bank
The bank has dedicated itself to the support of the project through negotiation of loan needed
for renovation of Korean environment, and visited to the job-site every half year in order to
check the process of the work, technical and financial problem, quality of construction, and
the provisions of the environment being applied. The bank has approved the withdrawal of the
fund appropriately at the request of the Korean Government.
6. The Factors affecting the progress of the project
0 Sewerage Division
This division establishes a set of comprehensive administration related to budget, design,
adjustment, supervision of the drainage, and controls the sewage treatment plant.
0 Headquarter of Construction
The headquarter divides the large-scale projects and places them into special departments,
and supervises them.
0 Supervising Group
This group has successfully supervised the construction and test operation appropriately.
7. The Role of Borrower (Pusan Metropolitan City)
The borrower has successfully performed to report the bank the progress status of the project
and various reports for financial operation every half year as well as to report the evaluation
analysis of environmental impact to the Ministry of Environment to abide and pursued
negotiation for change of project method.
For efficient operation of the plant, the city established a Management Office of
Environmental Facilities, which shall be entrusted for the operation of the plant when the
project finishes.
8. Evaluation of Outcome
The project is satisfactory, since there was no indicating point of faults throughout the whole
process.
9. Future Management
0 Control of Water Quality
. The design change to higher treatment caused the different basis between the designed
water quality and that of the Ministry of Environment. It is expected to impose excessive
environment burden money in the process of the plant operation by mean of
administration action in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to re-negotiate with the
Ministry of Environment in order to fix the designed water quality.
The ability of the sewage treatment in the winter is possibly decreased in the efficiency of
treatment because of lower water temperature. Therefore, it will be difficult to operate the
plant stably, and seems to be more difficult in treating T-N in particular. It needs,
therefore, to discuss with the Ministry of Environment for the application of water
quality regulation lower than the designed basis of water quality.
For the stable operation and management of the treatment plant, there must be a guideline
to regulate manufacturers, who exhaust the high density of T-N in the district, to meet
allowable basis of the density.
0 Management of Operation
. Pusan Metropolitan City is expected to control all the facilities effectively by establishing
a management corporation entrusted with all the environmental facilities since 1999. The
corporation has reduced human resources working with such facilities as well as cost
through operation the plant efficiently.
. Pusan Metropolitan City has judged itself that it is more effective to introduce civil capital
to construct all the facilities on the large-scale project in the future, anticipating lots of
difficulties in management of sound finance in the future considering the impossibility of
acquiring investment for the plant due to the poor financial structure, although it is urgent
to increase more facilities and water collecting drains right now.
0 Financial Management
. Recently due to lingering economic depression and # change of exchange rate between
US dollar and Korean Won, the appreciation of Korean Won v.s. US dollars will reduce
the amount of necessary money when invested, but depreciation of Korean Won will
increase more money than the contracted money when it is returned. Furthermore, the
interest rate of Korean banks lower than that of IBRD will affect the economic structure.
Therefore, it is necessary to introduce the lower interest rate with future negotiation
. In operating this project, much quantity of expensive chemicals(sodium hydroxide and
methanol) were put. Therefore, it is necessary to develop alternative chemicals for cost
reduction in the future.
0 Agreement with local residents
* Since it is expected to have lots of resistances with the residents who are sensitive to
environmental facilities like other places in the future, it is required to investigate the
impact of the surrounding environment for a certain period and control future
management thoroughly in order to heighten the credibility of the residents toward the
plant continually.
Tables:
A) Costs
.:Appraisal Estimate ._. -- AEtuEstimate--; -
-, j.! ' ., - Works - -- . Won -US$ Won-$
Million -Million : Million7 l Million -
Treatment Plant I 119,696 149.62 105,311 131.64
Tertiary Treatment 1 52,776 65.97 50,043 62.55
Interceptors ° a) 0 22,444 28.05
Implementation Support 2,560 3.20 24,109 30.14
Land Acquisition 19,065 23.83 19,806 24.76
Total Project Costs 194,097 242.62 221,713 277.14
a) Costs of interceptors and associated pumping stations in the treatment Plant
(1 $ =800 Won)
B) Disbursement
1) Appraisal Estimate in US $ million (Calendar Year)
Appraisal Estimate
Works'''';- W, ^ . . __ Total 1995- '1996 -1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Treatment Plant 149.62 8.32 43.37 54.18 35.63 8.12 0.00 0.00
Tertiary Treatment 65.97 0.00 4.15 30.26 26.91 4.65 0.00 0.00
Interceptors a)O OO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Implementation Support 3.20 0.59 0.77 0.81 0.85 0.18 0.00 0.00
Land Acquisition 23.83 23.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Project Costs 242.62 32.74 48.29 85.25 63.39 12.95 0 0
a) Costs of interceptors and associated pumping stations in the treatment Plant
2) Actual Estimate in US $ million(Calendar Year)
,, ., , ,, ,-lt, ,, -' - -; , r ;~ Ac~Isimate i ; | , -
;, 'g;<|(-K, N'r, Tt ,,i--995 1996.i 99 1f -9 2006. -2001
Treatment Plant 154.9 - 9.96 13.04 36.67 34.40 17.44 43.39
Tertiary Treatment b)0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Interceptors 28.53 - 6.25 17.50 1 .35 3.43
Implementation Support 10.24 2.10 0.40 1.92 1.64 3.65 0.01 0.52
Land Acquisition 24.79 17.22 5.95 1.62
Total Project Costs 218.46 19.32 16 31 22.83 55.81 39.4 20.88 43.91
b) Cost for re-design of the plant with the elimination of tertiary treatment in order to remove
Nitrogen and Phosphorus
C) Procurement
1) Appraisal Estimate in US $ million
,Pr6j~5Eebti6mn.rcrmnt .i~ Method .N .BF' Total Cos'ts
, 1:- ' -ICB -;t.- NCB -
Civil Works 134.20 134.20
(0.00) (0.00)
Equipment 78.39 3.00 81.39
(58.00) (2.00) (60.00)
Implementation 3.20 3.20
support (0.00) (0.00)
Land Acquisition 23.83 23.83
(0.00) (0.00)
Total 78.39 3.00 161.23 242.62
(58.00) (2.00) (0.00) (60.00)
N.B.F.: Remained money to be paid by the Bank
Amounts in brackets are already paid by the Bank
2) Actual Estimate in US $ million
Project EIi~f tL:7ProcurfM~th~e T _ - - -[. ,T6tal -Csts
Civil Works 116.17 116.17
Equipment 60.46 1.71 62.17
Implementation 10.24 10.24
support
Land Acquisition 24.79 24.79
Total 60.46 152.91 213.37
N.B.F.: Remained money to be paid by the Bank
Amounts in brackets are already paid by the Bank
D) Financing
.-Financing So ce u -F - Apr stie. |.~ Actual lstiiaX -.t
. - . - - QWon billion US $ million Won billion US $ rnillion .
IBRD Loan 48.00 60.00 43.37 60.46
Regional Development Fund 30.78 38.47
Environmental contribution 47. 88 59.85 71.10 88. 88
Government contribution
Pusan city contribution 15.56 19.45
Genetal account
Developer's contribution
Other contributions 10.76 13.45
Internal cash generation 76.92 96.15 36.98 46.22
Total Financing 219.14 273.92 167.21 209.0 1
-X- Costs of the project(US $242.62 mil) and interest during construction(US $3 1.30 mil)
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